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Abstract 
This paper examines six different approaches to nutrient management, and simulates the 
economic costs and environmental impacts associated with them using NManager, a partial 
equilibrium simulation model developed by Motu and NIWA, the National Institute for Water 
and Atmospheric Research. We focus on Lake Rotorua in the Bay of Plenty in New Zealand, 
where the regional council is concerned with the decline in the lake's water quality and has set a 
goal to restore the lake to its condition during the 1960s. 
Reaching this goal will require significant reductions in the amount of nutrients 
discharged into the lake, especially from non-point sources such as farm land. Managing water 
quality is made difficult by the presence of groundwater lags in the catchment: nutrients that 
leach from the soil arrive at the lake over multiple years. The mitigation schemes we consider are 
land retirement, requiring best practice, explicit nitrogen limits on landowners, a simple nutrient 
trading scheme, and two more complex trading schemes that account for groundwater lags. 
We demonstrate that best practice alone is not sufficient to meet the environmental 
target for Lake Rotorua. Under an export trading scheme, the distribution of mitigation across 
the catchment is more cost effective than its distribution under explicit limits on landowners or 
land retirement. However, the more complex trading schemes do not result in sufficient, or 
sufficiently certain, gains in cost effectiveness over the simple trading scheme to justify the 
increase in complexity involved in their implementation. 
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Non-point source water pollution is a serious problem in most developed countries, 
including New Zealand, and in an increasing number of developing countries (Sutton et al., 2011; 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2006).1 It is frequently considered intractable 
because it is so hard to regulate large numbers of small sources and because the science 
associated with it is so complex. New Zealand has demonstrated that it is possible to implement 
a cap-and-trade system to comprehensively cover nutrient leaching from farms (Duhon et al., 
2011). This paper tackles a further question: are complex regulatory systems required when the 
situation they address is complex? 
The “enabling myth” of the United States Acid Rain program, one of the most 
recognised tradable permit markets, was that the environmental impact of emissions was not 
spatially differentiated. The simplicity this allowed may have contributed to the successful 
legislation and implementation of the program (Stavins, 1997). More recently Muller and 
Mendelsohn (2009) argue for environmental regulations that match the marginal damages of 
pollution across space to the marginal costs of abatement. They estimate large gains in the cost 
effectiveness of regulation from spatially differentiated air quality policies in the United States. 
While obviously analytically correct, spatially differentiated policy is significantly more 
demanding of science and more complex to implement; whether the gain in efficiency justifies 
this additional complexity is an empirical question. 
The literature on the design of environmental markets is now extensive and 
sophisticated.
2 The literature on markets for water quality is mostly more recent. Shortle and 
Horan (2008) provide a recent summary. Hung and Shaw (2005) consider a trading ratio system 
which takes into account differentiated marginal damages and Prabodanie et al. (2010) discuss an 
offset approach. In terms of actual policy development, Selman et al. (2009) identified 57 trading 
systems focused on water quality worldwide, most of which were inactive. Of these, the majority 
are concerned with point sources, though some allow point sources to purchase reductions from 
non-point sources. Our paper both explores a more ambitious, but already implemented, 
approach to non-point source pollution and provides the first empirical estimates of the effects 
of regulatory complexity in a water quality cap-and-trade market. 
                                                 
1 “Inorganic nitrogen pollution of inland waterways has increased more than twofold globally since 1960 and more 
than tenfold for many industrialised parts of the world” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
2 Tietenberg (2006) provides an excellent introduction to the literature. 6 
 
When nitrogen moves through groundwater to a lake, the damage it causes is not 
spatially differentiated but is temporally differentiated. For a given series of lake water quality 
targets, it is more efficient to focus effort on abating nitrogen that will reach the lake rapidly. We 
build an integrated model of one catchment, Lake Rotorua in New Zealand, to estimate the 
efficiency gain from a sophisticated nitrogen trading program that incorporates the temporal 
differentiation caused by groundwater, relative to simple nitrogen regulation that does not. 
We find that, in this instance, the gains from the more sophisticated regulation are tiny 
and cannot possibly justify the additional complexity required. We also show that requiring best 
practice is insufficient to meet the challenging abatement targets and that relying purely on land 
retirement is an expensive option. 
1.1.  Water quality in Lake Rotorua and New Zealand 
Lake Rotorua is one of thirteen major lakes in the Bay of Plenty region of New Zealand. 
It has significant cultural value and provides numerous tourism opportunities. Te Arawa (the 
local iwi, or tribe) have ancestral ties to the lake and surrounding land that reach back more than 
600 years, and today 35% of residents are of Māori ancestry. The Tourism Strategy Group, of 
the Ministry of Economic Development, estimates the region attracts three million visitors 
annually, a quarter of whom are from overseas. 
Land use in the catchment surrounding the lake has intensified since the 1960s, resulting 
in increased discharges to the lake of nitrogen (Rutherford, 2003; 2008) and phosphorus 
(Rutherford et al., 1989). These nutrient discharges have caused eutrophication, toxic algal 
blooms, a decline in water quality, and the intermittent closure of the lake due to health risks 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2006). 
Through discussion with the Rotorua District Council, Te Arawa and the community, 
the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BoPRC)
3 set a target for water quality to be the same as it 
was in the 1960s (Environment Bay of Plenty et al., 2009). This involves reducing lake loads (the 
amount of nitrogen arriving at the lake) to 435 tonnes of nitrogen per year (tN/yr). As a result of 
groundwater lags, the time taken for nitrogen to move through the groundwater, not all exports 
reach the lake at once but will be realised as lake loads over multiple years. In 2009 total nitrogen 
exports were estimated to be 771 tN/yr, of which 73 percent comes from rural land; total lake 
loads were estimated to be 593 tN/yr (Environment Bay of Plenty et al., 2009). 
                                                 
3 Bay of Plenty Regional Council was, until 2010, named Environment Bay of Plenty. 7 
 
The BoPRC has begun to address the decline in water quality. Their initiatives include 
upgrades to the sewage and storm water system and to septic tanks, and addressing land 
management practices (Environment Bay of Plenty et al., 2009). In 2005 they introduced 
Rule 11, designed to freeze nutrient loss from land use at 2001–2004 levels (Environment Bay of 
Plenty, 2008).
4 Despite these initiatives, further intervention will be necessary to meet lake quality 
targets. 
A nitrogen trading system is expected to be a cost effective approach to control leaching 
into the lake. Lock and Kerr, (2008) design a trading system for Lake Rotorua that incorporates 
the temporal lags. New Zealand has some experience with allowance trading systems, namely the 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system used to manage marine fisheries (Newell et al., 
2005); the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZETS) used to manage greenhouse gases 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol (www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/); and a 
nitrogen trading system that was recently established by Waikato Regional Council
5 to manage 
the Lake Taupō catchment. 
In the Lake Taupō catchment, farms occupy about 20 percent of the land; however, they 
contribute more than 90 percent of the manageable nitrogen load (Rutherford and Cox, 2009). 
Waikato Regional Council has implemented a cap-and-trade scheme to prevent nutrients in the 
lake increasing beyond their present levels and has overseen the creation of a charitable trust, the 
Lake Taupo Protection Trust, charged with the permanent removal of 20 percent of the 
manageable nitrogen (Young et al., 2010). Although groundwater lags are present in the Lake 
Taupō catchment, the Waikato Regional Council chose not to implement regulation that 
incorporated groundwater lags or attenuation, both because of uncertainty in the underlying 
biophysics and because of the likely complexity of the regulatory and trading schemes. Some 
farmers lobbied for both attenuation and groundwater lags to be considered. However, it was 
felt that this was unnecessary (Environment Waikato, 2003). In contrast to Taupō’s 20 percent 
reduction, Rutherford et al. (2011) calculate that in the case of Lake Rotorua, exports need to be 
reduced by around 320 tN/yr, or 69 percent of the manageable exports, in order to meet the 
load target. Hence more severe intervention will be needed for Lake Rotorua than was necessary 
for Lake Taupō – this requires an even more efficient response. 
The paper is set out as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the models that support 
our research and section 3 introduces the NManager model. Different regulatory approaches are 
                                                 
4 A review of Rule 11 suggests that there is little quantitative evidence of its effectiveness and that more 
active enforcement is required (Foster and Kivell, 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that Rule 11 has helped 
prevent an increase in dairy farming in the Lake Rotorua/Rotoiti catchment (Maki, 2009). 
5 Waikato Regional Council was, until 2011, named Environment Waikato. 8 
 
introduced in section 4 and methods of solving them in section 5. The performance of different 
regulations is discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Supporting Models 
NManager combines data from several external models with its own internal calculations. 
This section gives an overview of the different models, and the inputs they provide to 
NManager. 
2.1.  ROTAN 
The Rotorua and Taupō Nutrient model (ROTAN) is a geographic information system-
based catchment hydrology and water quality model developed by NIWA (Rutherford et al., 
2008). 
ROTAN simulates the hydrogeology of the Lake Rotorua catchment. It distinguishes 
between nutrient exports and nutrient loads. Nutrient exports are the quantity of nutrients 
discharged from the land; nutrient loads are the quantity of nutrients reaching the lake. The 
translation from exports to loads is neither complete nor immediate due to attenuation and 
groundwater lags (Kerr and Rutherford, 2008). 
Attenuation is the temporary storage and/or permanent removal of nutrients from 
runoff, groundwater or stream flow. Some nutrients are taken up by plants before reaching the 
lake. However, this uptake is temporary: the nutrients are released following the death of the 
plant. Permanent removal of nitrogen occurs principally through denitrification, the conversion 
of nitrate into nitrogen gas. Attenuation has been found to be minimal in most of the Lake 
Rotorua catchment, with the exception of the Puarenga Stream (Rutherford et al., 2009; 2011). 
Groundwater lags are present across the Lake Rotorua catchment due to the presence of 
large underground aquifers. When nitrogen leaches off farmland, a certain amount is carried by 
surface water (streams) and enters the lake directly. The remainder enters the groundwater 
system, modelled as a series of well-mixed bucket aquifers, which slowly releases the nitrogen 
into the lake. ROTAN simulations suggest that 47 percent of nitrogen reaches the lake via 
surface water and 53 percent via groundwater (Rutherford et al., 2011). Groundwater lags 
determine the speed at which the nitrogen in the aquifers arrives at the lake. They depend on the 
distance of the exports from the lake, the size and speed of surface water streams, and the 
geology of the soil and underlying rock. For land close to the lake, groundwater lags are small. 
The lags increase the further land is from the lake and probably exceed 200 years for nitrogen 
emitted at the edge of the catchment. 9 
 
NIWA has extensively calibrated ROTAN to historical data from the Lake Rotorua 
catchment, using information about groundwater lags estimated using tracers and aquifer 
boundaries provided by GNS Science (Rutherford et al., 2009; 2011). GNS Science is using a 
detailed finite-element model to refine the current estimates of aquifer boundaries, flow 
pathways and travel times (Dr Chris Daughney, GNS Science, pers. comm.). Refinement of 
aquifer boundaries and associated residence times within ROTAN are the subject of ongoing 
NIWA and GNS Science research (Rutherford et al., 2008). 
2.2.  Farmax 
Farmax is a decision support model developed by AgResearch. It has been designed to 
assist dairy and sheep-beef farmers to maximise their productivity by simulating the profitability 
of farms under different management scenarios. Farmax has been evaluated against two 
independent New Zealand data sets (Bryant et al., 2010). 
Management decisions affect not only the profitability of a farm but the amount of 
nutrient that leaches from it. In Farmax these decisions include: farm type (for dairy farms, 
milking herds and dry stock were treated differently), stocking rate, fertiliser use, supplementary 
feed use, the choice of winter fodder crops, and whether animals are grazed on or off the land 
(Bryant et al., 2010). Clearing gorse has been shown to mitigate nitrogen leaching (Male et al., 
2010), however this is not yet included in Farmax. 
Outputs from Farmax are used, in conjunction with those from OVERSEER, to give 
feasible and realistic combinations of profit and nutrient exports. From these we express profit 
per hectare per year as a function of mitigation per hectare per year. Further details are given in 
section 3.4 and Appendix B. For the simulations run in Farmax we direct the reader to Smeaton 
et al. (2011). 
2.3.  OVERSEER 
OVERSEER is a farm management tool developed by AgResearch to help farmers 
maximise the productivity of their land (AgResearch, 2009). It also calculates nutrients lost to the 
environment, which has drawn the attention of regulatory bodies. 
The data inputs for OVERSEER are extensive and include: farm type, productivity (e.g., 
tonnes of milk solids per year for dairy farms), soil type, soil drainage class, slope, rainfall, 
stocking rate, fertiliser use, supplementary feed and area for effluent irrigation. The use of 
nitrogen inhibitors is included for on-farm mitigation. Changes in any of these inputs affect 
nutrient loss. 10 
 
3. Using NManager to Model Lake Rotorua 
NManager is intended to reflect the complex biophysical properties of the catchment and 
the behaviour of landowners under regulation. This section details how the reality of the 
catchment is represented in NManager. 
Figure 1 shows the nitrogen exports and loads in the Lake Rotorua catchment used in 
NManager assuming current land use and farming practices continue, compared to the target of 
435 tN/yr, and the unmanageable nitrogen loads used in NManager. 
Figure 1: Exports and lake loads with no change in land use 
 
At present NManager assumes that 771 tN/yr are exported from the catchment but only 
593 tN/yr are currently realised as lake loads; this difference is due to the rate at which nitrogen 
moves through the groundwater. Unmanageable loads are those arising from nutrients already in 
the groundwater (legacy loads) and exports that cannot be controlled via land management. How 
NManager handles groundwater flows is described below. The unmanageable exports consist of 
4  kg N/ha/yr across the entire catchment (excluding Waipa forest, where leaching is 2  kg 
N/ha/yr) and all nitrogen from sewage, septic tanks, the RLTS and geothermal and urban areas. 
NManager considers 308 tN/yr to be unmanageable exports. 
3.1.  Modelling the transportation of nutrients to the lake 
Groundwater lags are defined for each parcel of land in the catchment. The lags are 
described by their mean residence time (MRT), the mean time that nitrogen spends in the 
groundwater. For ease of analysis, parcels were aggregated into eight groundwater lag zones 


































Lag zone 1, the closest to the lake, has the lowest MRT and lag zone 8, the farthest from the 
lake, has the highest MRT. Table 1 gives the MRT, size and percentage of nutrients in the 
catchment for each lag zone. Figure 2 shows the catchment by groundwater lag zone. 
Table 1: Overview of the groundwater lag zones 
Lag  Zone  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
MRT (years)  2.5  8 15 30 50 70  90  110
Number of ha  150  1,390 2,335 6,855 8,290 9,440  11,610  5,090
Nutrients 
transported (%) 
0.2 3.4 5.1 12.8 19.0 25.5  24.7 9.3
Figure 2: NManager groundwater lag zones 
 
In NManager groundwater lags are described by a series of Unit Response Functions 
(URFs), one URF for each lag zone. URFs describe the nitrogen loads from a single unit of 
nitrogen entering the groundwater as a function of time since export. Each URF is constructed 
according to the behaviour of a single aquifer with steady flow as an approximation to ROTAN. 
Figure 3 gives the cumulative sum of the URFs used by NManager. Each curve gives the 
percentage of nitrogen from the groundwater, exported at time zero that has since arrived in the 
lake. For example, if nitrogen is exported from lag zones 4 and 5, then after 50 years 80 percent 
of the nitrogen from lag zone 4 and 60 percent of the nitrogen from lag zone 5 that entered into 
the groundwater will have reached the lake. 12 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative sum of Unit Response Functions by groundwater lag zone 
 
Nitrogen exports from a single year result in loads to the lake over multiple years as 
expressed by the URFs. These loads are additive across time and across different locations in the 
catchment. The nitrogen load at time  , from parcel  , delivered via groundwater can be 
expressed as follows: 
      
                             
   
   
 
where     is the proportion of nitrogen exports delivered to the lake via groundwater (ROTAN 
suggests       57%),       is the quantity of nitrogen exported from parcel   at time  ; and 
   ·  is the URF for the lag zone associated with the parcel. NManager evaluates this sum using 
an annual time step for each time  . 
Nitrogen loads delivered via surface water arrive in the lake in the same year they are 
exported. The load from parcel  , delivered via surface water at time  , can be expressed as 
follows: 
      
         1             
And the total load to the lake at time   can be expressed as: 
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3.2.  Legacy loads 
Legacy loads are the nitrogen loads already present in the Lake Rotorua groundwater that 
will be realised as inputs to the lake in future years. These loads are the result of groundwater 
lags acting on historic exports from agricultural land use and septic tanks. They are independent 
of future land use and cannot be targeted by mitigation. 
Legacy loads and those arising from unmanageable exports contribute to the total lake 
load and must therefore be adjusted for when considering which loads can be targeted by 
changes in land management practices (the total unmanageable loads are shown in Figure 1). 
Figure 4 gives the legacy loads estimated by ROTAN. These are incorporated into NManager 
using the exponential curve fitted to the results. 
Figure 4: Legacy loads: ROTAN results from 2009 
 
3.3.  Modelling the use of land in the catchment 
Landowners’ responses to regulation will depend on their current land use. We are 
interested in the various types of land use and where the uses occur. Land use and location are 
specified in NManager using the ROTAN map for current land use (National Institute of Water 
and Atmospheric Research, dataset, 2011). This map was constructed in two steps: a 2005 land-
use map was constructed by BoPRC based on 2003 aerial photographs of land cover and results 
from a land-use questionnaire sent to landowners in 2005. The map was updated to a 2010 land-






























(Rutherford et al., 2011). Table 2 gives the land areas, leaching and total exports of the different 
land types included in NManager.
6 
Table 2: Land area and base leaching in NManager 
  Land area  Leaching per hectare 
(kg N / ha / yr) 
Exports to the lake 
(t N / yr) 
Dairy 5,363  56  300 
Sheep/beef 15,375  16  246 
Forestry 21,023    4  7 81 
Urban     28 
Geothermal areas      30 
Sewage, septic tanks and RLTS 8     86 
Total 45,185    771 
Due to similarities between leaching rates some land-use categories were merged. Bare 
ground, horticulture, lifestyle, dairy dry stock and different types of sheep and cattle farming 
were merged into a sheep-beef category. Scrub, wetlands and different types of forest were 
merged into a forestry category. Cropping was merged with dairy. The resulting land-use 
categories in NManager are: Dairy, Sheep-beef, Forestry, the Rotorua Land Treatment System, 
Septic tanks, Tikitere geothermal area, Whakarewarewa geothermal area, Urban and Urban open 
space. These are estimated at a 1 hectare spatial scale. 
Leaching from forestry and scrub land is small and cannot be further mitigated via land 
management. However, some land classified as scrub is covered in gorse and has a high rate of 
nitrogen loss. Replacing gorse land with forestry is expected to result in a 40 tN/yr reduction in 
nitrogen leaching (Male et al., 2010). Separating gorse from other scrub land has been left for 
future research. 
Figure 5 gives the distribution of land use in each lag zone. We have combined the 
smaller land uses into a single category labelled “other”. We observe that there is very little land 
in the first three lag zones, dairy is concentrated in lag zones 4 to 7, and sheep-beef farming is 
spread across all lag zones. 
                                                 
6 The Rotorua and Taupō Nutrient Model (ROTAN) suggests some nitrogen reaches the lake, via 
groundwater, from land outside the surface water catchment (Rutherford et al., 2011). This has not been included in 
NManager. 
7 All forestry, other than the Waipa forest, an area of about 1,500 hectares, is estimated by ROTAN to 
have leaching of 4 kg N/yr. Leaching for the Waipa forest is estimated to be 2 kg N/yr. 
8 Rotorua Land Treatment System: Treated effluent from the Rotorua Wastewater Treatment Plant is 
sprayed onto land in the Whakarewarewa Forest. 15 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of land use by groundwater lag zone 
 
3.4.  The shape of the profit functions 
We model landowners’ land management practices using profit functions. These express 
the profit of a farm, per hectare per year, as a function of mitigation and land use change, per 
hectare per year. Mitigation occurs via changes in stocking rates, fertiliser and nitrogen inhibitor 
usage, and farm management. 
NManager distinguishes between land initially used for dairy farming and sheep-beef 
farming by representing each with a different profit function. All farms of each type are assumed 
to be homogeneous and have the same leaching and profit per hectare before regulation. These 
are shown in Table 3, along with the minimum leaching possible for each land use according to 
Smeaton et al. (2011). As 4 kg N/ha/yr is the minimum leaching possible under any land use, we 
define manageable leaching, the leaching a landowner can control via mitigation, as 4 kg 
N/ha/yr less than the corresponding leaching value. 
Table 3: Leaching and profit by land use 
Land use  Dairy  Sheep-beef  Forestry 
Leaching (kg N/ha/yr)  56  16  4 
Manageable leaching (kg N/ha/yr)  52  12  0 
Minimum leaching (kg N/ha/yr)  28  10  4 
Minimum manageable leaching (kg N/ha/yr)  24  6  0 































Dairy Sheep‐beef Forestry Other16 
 
Under regulation landowners may choose to convert their land to less nitrogen-intensive 
land uses. This is represented in NManager by profit functions that span the different uses of 
land. 
Where our results suggest a level of leaching that is less than the minimum leaching for 
one land use but greater than the maximum leaching for the next less intensive land use, we 
assume a landowner will have minimised the leaching of their current land use and then 
converted a proportion of their land to the less intensive land use in order to satisfy the leaching 
reduction on average across their farm. For example: a landowner with a leaching of 20 kg 
N/ha/yr is assumed to have 33 percent of their land as dairy (leaching 28 kg N/ha/yr) and 67 
percent of their land as sheep/beef (leaching 16 kg N/ha/yr). 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 give the profit functions for dairy farm land and sheep-beef farm 
land respectively. These are fitted as quadratic curves to simulation results from Farmax and 
OVERSEER (Smeaton et al., 2011). The “X”s in these figures mark the base and minimum 
leaching levels for dairy and sheep/beef farming. As the curves are concave, the marginal cost of 
mitigation increases as mitigation increases. 
Note that the profit curve for dairy farms spans the simulation results for sheep-beef 
farms and intersects the result for forestry profit, and that the profit curve for sheep-beef farms 
intersects the result for forestry profit. Some results were included even though they were 
dominated by other results, in an attempt to recognise heterogeneity between farmers, so the 
curves are more reflective of an average farmer. 






























Dairy Sheep/beef Forestry17 
 
Figure 7: Sheep-beef land profit function 
 
These profit functions include capital costs and the cost of converting land to forestry. 
They assume present conditions persist. Abnormal weather conditions (e.g. droughts) and 
changes in commodity prices may give significantly different results from those predicted. 
4. The Design of Regulation 
Regulation aims to control landowners’ behaviour or to provide financial incentives for 
landowners to manage and reduce their nitrogen exports to meet the objectives of society. We 
are interested in the implications of different regulations and their cost effectiveness for reaching 
the mitigation targets. In this section we specify six approaches available to BoPRC. In order of 
complexity they are: requiring best practice; land retirement; an export trading scheme where 
landowners must hold sufficient allowances to cover nitrogen exports from their property each 
year; and two vintage trading schemes which attempt to incorporate the timing of nitrogen loads, 
via groundwater, into the regulatory scheme in a simple way. The trading schemes follow the 
design given in Lock and Kerr (2008) and Kerr et al. (2007). These approaches are simulated 
using NManager in section 6. 
4.1.  Best practice 
Output from Farmax and OVERSEER estimates minimum possible leaching for dairy 
and sheep-beef farming. We model the adoption of best practice by assuming leaching is reduced 





























This is modelled as a step change from business as usual in 2015. Leaching from all dairy 
land is reduced to 28 kg N/ha/yr and leaching from all sheep-beef land is reduced to 
10 kg N/ha/yr. We assume that there is no change in land use. 
4.2.  Land retirement 
For modelling land retirement we assume all mitigation comes from some landowners 
changing their land use to a less nitrogen-intensive use. There is no change in the leaching rates 
per hectare for each land use. 
In NManager, sheep-beef land is initially retired to become forest before dairy land is 
retired to new sheep-beef land. If necessary, this new sheep-beef land is then retired into 
forestry. We assume that land is retired equally across the catchment, hence land retirement in 
each year can be described by three percentages: the percentage of initial sheep-beef land that 
has been retired into forestry, the percentage of dairy land that has been retired into new sheep-
beef land, and the percentage of this new sheep-beef land that has also been retired into forestry. 
4.3.  An export trading scheme 
The environmental targets for Lake Rotorua are specified in terms of acceptable nitrogen 
loads to the lake. However, landowners manage the amount of nitrogen they put onto the land, 
from which it is relatively easy to estimate exports from their property (for example, using 
OVERSEER), but difficult to estimate loads reaching the lake. This suggests that regulation that 
targets exports will be more straightforward than regulation that targets lake loads. 
Under an export trading scheme the regulator provides a supply of annual export 
allowances. At the end of each year landowners must surrender sufficient allowances to cover 
the nitrogen leaching from their property for that year. Landowners who do not have sufficient 
allowances to cover their leaching will have to either purchase unused allowances from 
landowners with excess allowances, reduce their exports, or risk non-compliance. By controlling 
the supply of export allowances a regulator can manage the amount of nitrogen that reaches the 
lake. The Lake Taupō scheme has this form. 
A trading scheme is desirable, as it encourages mitigation to occur where it is most cost 
effective. Profit-maximising landowners will mitigate as long as it costs less than the allowances 
they would otherwise have to hold. The price of allowances will be such that all allowances are 
used and each landowner is indifferent between further mitigation and purchasing additional 
allowances. It follows that under a trading scheme the least costly mitigation activities will take 
place first. 19 
 
In this study all farms with the same land use have the same mitigation costs. Hence 
trading encourages mitigation on the land use where it is cheapest. In reality, there are large 
differences among farms of the same type, so trading will encourage mitigation on farms where it 
is cheapest. 
A trading scheme is not without administrative difficulties. Successful implementation of 
a trading scheme requires good monitoring and enforcement. Furthermore, the regulator must 
determine the initial allocation of allowances. This can be an extensive political process with high 
potential costs. A trading system that has lower overall cost and is perceived to be fair may, 
however, be easier to enforce. 
4.4.  Vintage trading 
Groundwater lags are a major feature of the Lake Rotorua catchment. Taking account of 
groundwater lags in the design of regulation can result in more cost-effective mitigation as 
landowners will surrender allowances that better correspond to their effect on lake loads. Under 
a vintage trading scheme, additional gains in cost effectiveness can arise from trades between lag 
zones that change the timing of mitigation. A landowner at the back of the catchment can either 
mitigate now or pay another farmer to increase mitigation at the front of the catchment in the 
future (by buying allowances from them). This delay in mitigation makes no difference to the 
nitrogen load reaching the lake. However, because it defers the cost of mitigation, it reduces the 
net present value of the cost of mitigation. We consider two simple vintage trading schemes that 
attempt to reflect the timing of nitrogen loads to the lake. These schemes attempt to link lake 
loads to exports via vintage allowances. 
A vintage trading scheme works in a similar way to an export trading scheme. The main 
difference is that vintage allowances permit landowners to release nitrogen into the lake, rather 
than to export it from their land. Therefore landowners are trading rights for lake loads not 
exports. Under regulation, landowners must surrender allowances at the end of each year to 
cover the lake loads that will be caused by the nitrogen leaching from their property from that 
year. 
Although groundwater leaching is a continuous process, some approximation is required 
to implement a vintage trading scheme. The design of regulation must provide some convention 
that specifies for landowners the vintage allowances they must surrender in each year. We 
consider two possible regulatory conventions: a two-pulse vintage scheme that closely 
approximates the ideal situation, and a one-pulse vintage scheme that might be more likely in 
practice. These follow the design of a vintage scheme given in Kerr et al. (2007). 20 
 
The one-pulse vintage scheme allocates each lag zone a lag time that approximates its 
mean groundwater lag time. In each year, landowners must surrender allowances of the vintage 
that corresponds to the current year plus their lag time. For example, suppose a landowner with 
a lag time of six years exports nitrogen in 2020. Under the one-pulse trading scheme they must 
surrender vintage allowances for the year 2026. 
Table 4 summarises the lags for the one-pulse vintage scheme. These lags were selected 
as the average travel time for all water (47 percent of the surface water time (zero) plus 53 
percent of the groundwater time, represented by the MRTs for each lag zone given in Table 1). 
Table 4: Lag times for the one-pulse vintage scheme 
Groundwater  lag  zone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lag times  1 yr  4 yrs 8 yrs 16 yrs 27 yrs 37 yrs  48 yrs  58 yrs
In the two-pulse vintage scheme, each year landowners surrender current-year allowances 
to match 47 percent of their exports (to cover nitrogen that travels through surface water); the 
other 53 percent of exports is matched from the vintage that corresponds to the current year 
plus their lag time (to cover nitrogen that travels through groundwater). It specifies lag times that 
apply only to groundwater leaching (the MRTs from Table 1). For example, suppose a 
landowner with a lag time of 6 years exports 100 kg of nitrogen in 2020. Under the two-pulse 
trading scheme he must, in 2020, surrender 47 kg of 2020 vintage allowances and 53 kg of 2026 
vintage allowances. 
Table 5: Lag times for the two-pulse vintage scheme 
Groundwater  lag  zone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lag times  2 yrs  8 yrs 15 yrs 30 yrs 50 yrs 70 yrs  90 yrs  110 yrs
Unlike export trading schemes, vintage trading schemes have never been implemented. 
The complexity of these schemes makes them difficult to implement and administer. 
Landowners also face a more obviously complex challenge to optimise their response to the 
regulation. They need to manage their holdings of allowances (which would be issued many years 
in advance of use) anticipating their future needs. Although allowances of all vintages could be 
traded from the first year, markets for vintages many years out are likely to be thin so prices may 
not be very informative. Prices across different vintages will be interdependent, making them 
hard to predict (see Appendix C). A time inconsistency problem may also arise. If landowners 
use all future vintages early in the program the only way future farmers will be able to mitigate 21 
 
sufficiently may be to stop farming. The future regulator is unlikely to find this acceptable and 
may change the policy. Thus constraints may need to be placed on the use of future allowances. 
Finally, regulation that targets lake loads will involve more apparent scientific uncertainty 
than regulation that targets exports. Landowners manage the amount of nitrogen they put onto 
the land, from which it is relatively easy to estimate exports from their property (for example, 
using OVERSEER), but difficult to estimate loads reaching the lake because we must also 
estimate the length of ground water lags. 
5. Simulating Landowner Behaviour under Regulation 
For a specified regulatory system, NManager determines the pattern of nitrogen exports 
that will be chosen by profit-maximising landowners. Furthermore, for a specified set of 
environmental targets and a given regulatory scheme, NManager can determine the stringency of 
regulation necessary to meet those targets. These solutions are unique. This section specifies how 
NManager solves for the optimal pattern of nitrogen exports to meet given targets under 
different regulatory schemes. Non-technical readers may wish to skip forward to section 6. 
5.1.  Solving for cost-effective land retirement 
For a specified series of environmental targets, the acceptable levels of lake loads for 
some times       0,  , NManager determines the percentage of land retired under land 
retirement regulation necessary to ensure nitrogen targets are met. 
Let   , 
   be the amount of manageable nitrogen that leaches from land use   at time   and 
arrives in the lake at time   (  , 
   0   i f       ). The lag for a unit of nitrogen represented by   , 
   
is      . Before the introduction of regulation, we can therefore express the manageable lake 
loads without regulation in year   as: 
manageable loads w/out regulation         , 
 
     
 
Let   
  be the percentage of land, from land use  , that has been retired by year  . For 
land retirement regulation, we consider three land uses: current sheep/beef farming (      ), 
which is retired to forestry at a cost of    ; dairy farming (    ), which is retired to new 
sheep/beef farming at a cost of   ; and new sheep/beef farming (        ), which is retired to 
forestry at a cost of     . 
We therefore determine   
  (for all   and  ) in order to minimise the total cost of land 
retirement given by: 22 
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Given these equations, we can formulate a constrained optimisation problem. As the 
costs and effects of land retirement are constant over time and between farmers, we can reduce 
the constrained optimisation model to three sequential simultaneous equations (one equation for 
each land use). As   ,   0   i f        and   ,   0   i f        these simultaneous equations, and 
therefore the constrained optimisation problem, will always have a unique solution. 
5.2.  Solving a trading scheme 
For a trading scheme with given allowance caps, NManager determines landowners’ 
profit-maximising quantity of nitrogen exports, in each time period, by finding the allowance 
price under which the supply of allowances equals the demand. This price will equal the cost of 
the last unit of mitigation. The algorithm mimics the behaviour of a decentralised market by 
updating the price of allowances in response to excess supply and demand. 
We next give a formal presentation of the model used in NManager. Profit for 
landowner         1,…,   at time   depends on their quantity of nitrogen exports    . The 
profit for landowner   at time   is: 
                ,   
   0  
Let    be the current price of allowances in year  . Profit-maximising landowners will 
choose    
   the quantity of nitrogen exports that maximises their profit, less the opportunity cost 
of holding allowances
9 as follows: 
    
                                    
The total demand for allowances of year   is given by: 
D            , 
 
 
     
                                                 
9 We consider only the holding of allowances. By the Coase Theorem, our final results and costs of 
mitigation are independent of the initial allocation of allowances, and who buys and sells allowances. 23 
 
For a specified path of environmental targets, NManager determines the unique set of 
allowance caps for each year      that ensures all nutrient targets are met. The market-clearing 
prices will be      such that for all allowances: 
D           0      D                0   t 
We use an iterative numerical method (the Newton-Raphson algorithm) to solve for the 
prices of allowances in equilibrium. See Appendix A for further details. 
5.3.  Solving the vintage trading schemes 
The basic approach is the same as above but two critical features differentiate it: caps are 
on loads, not exports, and prices are interdependent across vintages. 
Let        ,    1,…, , be the lag times specified by the regulatory scheme for 
landowner  . The percentage of exports it models as carried to the lake at lag time   is given 
by   . In the one-pulse vintage scheme   1  and     1 . In the two-pulse vintage 
scheme     2,     0 . 4 7  and     0 . 5 3 . The surface water flow has a lag time of zero for all 
lag zones (      0   ). 
For each lag time landowners must surrender       allowances of vintage        . Profit-
seeking landowners will choose    
  , the quantity of nitrogen exports that maximises their profit 
net of allowance holdings, as follows: 
   
        
     ,…,      K; ,θ  ,…,θ K                              
1
 1                
 
  
where   is the discount rate and    is the price at time   of allowances of vintage  . Vintage 
trading schemes require landowners to surrender allowances of the same vintage in different 
years. Because allowances are an asset, by the Hotelling rule, their value should be expected to 
rise at the real market rate of return. Mitigation each year is determined by the price of the 
relevant vintage allowances in that year; therefore NManager discounts the price of each 
allowance into the year of surrender. Results in this paper use a seven percent real interest rate. 
This is the rate used by BoPRC. 
The total demand for allowances of vintage   is given by: 
 D        ,…,   ,…,      K; ,    ,θ             ,     
 
K
     
 24 
 
As in the export trading system, the market-clearing price in each market will depend on 
the supply and demand in that market but in this case it will also depend on the prices, and 
hence indirectly the demand and supply, in all other markets. We use an iterative numerical 
method to determine the equilibrium set of prices of all vintage allowances simultaneously. 
5.4.  Handling boundary conditions 
Incorporating groundwater lags in the vintage trading schemes requires landowners to 
hold allowances of the same vintage in different years. Unless these schemes have a fixed 
duration, finding an exact solution would require solving over an infinite length of time. 
We may find a finite approximation to the solution under two assumptions: the first is 
weak dependence between markets: if we choose   sufficiently large then the dependence 
between markets at time   and       is weak. The second is price convergence: all the prices 
beyond some time   are constant and equal to price   . This assumption is reasonable so long as 
the number of allowances is constant many periods before time  . 
Assuming convergence of vintage prices may introduce error into the results by creating 
artificially stable prices. Testing of different thresholds suggests that     400 is sufficient to 
minimise any artificial stability if we limit our results to the first 200 years. 
6. The Performance of Different Regulatory Schemes 
This section presents simulation results from NManager for the regulatory schemes 
introduced in section 4. We compare and discuss the results for the different schemes. 
6.1.  Requiring best practice 
We first consider the environmental outcome of best management practice. Figure 8 
gives the total lake loads under best practice regulation modelled as a step change in land use, 
and hence exports, in 2015. If this regulation were to be implemented in the Lake Rotorua 
catchment, we would most likely observe a more gradual decrease in exports and hence lake 
loads as landowners would need a transition period toward full regulation. 25 
 
Figure 8: Nutrient loads under best practice regulation 
 
Under regulation, we observe a step decrease in lake loads due to surface water in 2015, 
followed by loads tending towards their long-run values. Requiring landowners to implement 
best practice on their land reduces nitrogen exports by 242 tN/yr and results in long-run loads of 
529 tN/yr. This is not sufficient to meet the environmental target, suggesting that some land 
retirement will be necessary to ensure acceptable lake quality in the long run.
10 
6.2.  The performance of regulation that meets the target 
We now consider the effects of land retirement, export trading and two forms of vintage 
trading regulation. For these approaches NManager requires that regulation results in the lake 
loads under regulation given in Figure 9. 
The load path under regulation was specified so that the long-run environmental target 
for the lake would be reached in 50 years and nitrogen loads would remain constant from then 
onwards. The lake loads under the different regulatory schemes were matched to the specified 
load path by controlling the stringency of the regulation. 
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Figure 9: Nutrient loads required for regulation comparison 
 
Despite these regulatory approaches having identical environmental outcomes, the cost 
of mitigation under the schemes is not the same. The land retirement scheme will equalise the 
marginal costs of land use change but on-farm mitigation costs will not be equalised. The export 
scheme will equalise marginal costs of land-use change and on-farm mitigation within and 
between farms. Thus the export scheme will have lower total mitigation costs.  
Our estimates of costs and prices are likely to be underestimates because they assume 
that farmers respond instantly and efficiently to the regulation. In reality this is unlikely because 
they will face some regulatory uncertainty, farmers may take time to work out an optimal 
response, the market or retirement scheme may not operate efficiently, they may have objectives 
other than profit maximisation, and some farms may be excluded from direct regulation due to 
their small size. As our current model is static, it also ignores any costs associated with restricting 
nitrogen to current levels and costs from changes in commodity prices. On the other hand it 
ignores the possibility of technology change. 
Table 6: Net present value of the cost of mitigation for straightforward regulation 
Scheme  Land retirement  Export trading 
Cost on dairy farms ($ millions)  58.3  47.7 
Cost on sheep-beef farms ($ millions)  26.5  20.5 






































Table 6 gives the Net Present Value (NPV) in 2010 of the cost of mitigation, estimated 
by NManager, under each of the schemes.
11 The cost of mitigation under the export trading 
scheme is estimated to be 20 percent less than under land retirement. 
Figure 10: Allowance prices and percentage mitigated 
 
Figure 10 gives the price of allowances and the percentage of exports mitigated in each 
year under export trading regulation. The price of allowances is equivalent to the marginal cost 
of leaching, and will be equivalent to the marginal cost of mitigation for all landowners who are 
yet to convert their land to forestry, and are therefore still able to mitigate further. The yearly 
price of allowances given by NManager suggests that the net present value of a stream of export 
allowances is approximately $460. This is consistent with the trading price of allowances in the 
Lake Taupō catchment reported by Duhon et al. (2011). 
6.2.1.  Cost under more complex trading schemes 
We now consider the vintage trading schemes to determine whether further gains in cost 
effectiveness are possible from changes in the distribution of mitigation across lag zones. Under 
a vintage trading scheme, the set of allowances farmers must surrender to match their loads 
differs around the catchment. As a result, there are possible benefits from landowners at the 
back of the catchment delaying mitigation at first and paying for increased mitigation at the front 
of that catchment in the future. Ideally the marginal cost of mitigation effort should be matched 
to the present value of the environmental benefits (in terms of avoided future mitigation). 
                                                 

















































































Figure 11 gives the percentage of pre-regulation manageable nitrogen within each lag 
zone that is mitigated under regulation.
12 Approximately 75 percent of all manageable nitrogen 
must be mitigated to reach the environmental target. Under an export trading scheme this 
mitigation is relatively evenly distributed across the catchment; any differences are driven only by 
the initial land use mix. Both the vintage schemes result in an increase in the percentage of 
mitigation for lag zones closer to the lake and a decrease in mitigation for the lag zones further 
from the lake. For example, 68 percent of the nitrogen in lag zone 4 is mitigated under an export 
trading scheme. This rises to 75 percent under the two-pulse scheme and to 100 percent under 
the one-pulse vintage scheme. 
Figure 11: Percentage of nutrients mitigated within each lag zone  
 
These differences are largely due to the relative vintage prices faced by landowners in 
different lag zones. Under the export trading scheme landowners in all lag zones face the same 
price for allowances in each year and therefore each lag zone will carry out a similar percentage 
of mitigation. However, due to intertemporal trading under the vintage schemes landowners in 
lag zones further from the lake face lower marginal costs for the set of allowances they must 
surrender in the year they export nitrogen than land owners closer to the lake; therefore they will 
carry out a smaller percentage of mitigation. 
                                                 
12 For each lag zone: percentage mitigated = (exports before regulation – exports after regulation) / 
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Figure 12: Nominal and discounted vintage allowance prices 
 
Figure 12 gives the nominal prices of vintage allowances (i.e. the price in the year the 
load reaches the lake) and the price of these allowances discounted to the year 2010 under the 
two-pulse vintage trading scheme. For comparison we include the price of allowances under the 
export trading scheme. 
We observe that the nominal price of allowances under the two-pulse vintage trading 
scheme is significantly greater than the nominal price of allowances under the export trading 
scheme. As vintage prices are discounted depending on lag times, the nominal price of vintage 
allowances must be higher than the nominal price of export trading allowances, so that after 
discounting the two approaches result in similar marginal costs of leaching. 
Table 7: Marginal cost of leaching by lag zone in 2010 
Lag  zone  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Marginal cost of leaching 
two-pulse vintage scheme 
32.61 31.70 27.58 20.66 16.97 15.95 15.70 15.64 
Table 7 gives the marginal cost of leaching in 2010 for landowners in each lag zone 
under the two-pulse vintage trading scheme. These are calculated as 47 percent of the price of 
2010 allowances plus 53 percent of the discounted price of allowances corresponding to the lag 
times given in Table 5. Under the export trading scheme the marginal cost of leaching is $17.40 
for all lag zones. This is similar to the average of the marginal costs of leaching under the two-











































Table 8 gives the NPV of the cost of mitigation under each of the trading schemes. 
Table 8: Comparison of costs of different trading schemes 




NPV ($ millions)  68.2  75.5  67.7 
While both vintage schemes reduce the amount of mitigation that takes place at the back 
of the catchment, they increase the amount of mitigation that takes place at the front of the 
catchment. The net effect is that the one-pulse vintage scheme is less cost effective than the 
export trading scheme and that the two-pulse vintage scheme has only a slightly lower cost of 
mitigation than the export trading scheme. These results suggest that there are not significant 
gains in cost effectiveness from introducing a more complex regulatory scheme for Lake Rotorua 
and that a poor choice of regulatory lag times may result in less cost-effective regulation. 
The allowances surrendered by landowners even under a two-pulse vintage scheme will 
still be an approximation to the lake loads they are responsible for. A vintage trading scheme that 
better approximates lake loads would be more cost effective. We also considered a nine-pulse 
vintage scheme but found that despite the increase in the accuracy with which it captured lake 
loads it resulted in a net present value for the cost of mitigation of $67.5 million; a less than 0.2 
percent reduction in the cost of mitigation. 
6.2.2.  Implications of different regulations for land use change 
Figure 13 gives estimates for the long-run proportion of land in each of the land uses 
under the different regulatory approaches. 




















Unsurprisingly, the land retirement scheme sees significant change in land use, since it produces 
all of its mitigation by changes from nutrient-intensive land uses to less nutrient-intensive land 
uses. In this scenario, all dairy land is retired to sheep/beef, and less productive sheep/beef land 
is retired into forestry. 
The trading schemes see a different pattern of land-use change, because they allow a 
mixture of best-practice land management reforms and land retirement.
13 This means that, 
although all dairy land is still retired in the long term, by improving land management practices 
more land can be maintained, particularly in the short term, in the more nitrogen-intensive (and 
more profitable) uses.
14 The incentives to improve management rather than retire land to a less 
profitable use are large. These results are sensitive to the assumed profitability of forestry; under 
the emissions trading system, more sheep/beef land may be converted to forestry and some 
dairy may be sustained in the long run.  
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have created a model, NManager, and used it to evaluate a range of possible designs 
of regulations to improve water quality. Our key results are that only requiring best practice will 
probably not be sufficient to meet the environmental target for the lake. Land retirement 
regulation could meet the targets but a large share of the pastoral land in the catchment would 
need to be retired into forestry. It is likely that a mixture of these two approaches, as represented 
by export or vintage trading regulation, would be preferable. 
By controlling the stringency of regulation we were able to ensure that the land 
retirement, export trading and vintage trading schemes resulted in the same path of 
environmental outcomes that achieve the lake load target of 435 tN/yr from land use within fifty 
years. This allowed us to compare costs across outcomes. We found that export trading reduced 
cost by 20 percent relative to land retirement only. In exploring more complex trading systems, 
however, we found very small gains from an efficient system that reflects groundwater lags. We 
also found that a plausible approximation to the efficient system that might better reflect a real 
regulatory response to groundwater lags actually increased costs relative to the simple export 
system. These results suggest that, in the case of Lake Rotorua, the extra complexity associated 
with accounting for groundwater lags would at best not be worth the additional difficulties 
associated with implementation, and at worst could be counterproductive. 
                                                 
13 The two-pulse vintage trading scheme reports similar land use to the export trading scheme, but with 55 
percent of the catchment in forestry, from the retirement of more low-quality sheep/beef land. 
14 Under land retirement regulation, NManager estimates than all dairy land will be retired to sheep/beef 
farming within seven years, while under export trading regulation this takes twenty years. 32 
 
The result on the value of complexity is an empirical one and hence specific to the Lake 
Rotorua catchment. Non-rigorous exploration of sensitivity to key model and scenario features 
suggest that it is driven by a high percentage of nitrogen flowing through surface water – which 
implies that all mitigation has some immediate effect; by the stringency of regulation – because in 
the extreme, all nitrogen must be mitigated so there is no flexibility; by the specific local 
distribution of groundwater lags – in Rotorua there seems to be very little land with short 
groundwater lags; and with the discount rate – a higher discount rate makes the price of future 
vintages very low so the current price of allowances to cover surface water flows dominates 
farmers’ responses. These factors may be different in another catchment. 
These empirical results complement a series of papers on various aspects of design: 
monitoring, transaction costs, scope/participation, legal/compliance, and cost-sharing, for a 
nutrient trading system (www.motu.org.nz/research/detail/nutrient_trading). Many Regional 
Councils around New Zealand are faced with water quality challenges and nutrient sources 
similar to those in Rotorua, and operate under the same legal framework. With attention to 
differences among catchments, including the severity of the problem, rivers versus lakes, 
attenuation, land uses, and economic conditions, this work can provide a good starting place for 
more in-depth local analysis. 
These initial results could be extended in several ways. Farmers can be made 
heterogeneous; this would allow us to better compare administrative allocations (export capping) 
to a trading scheme. The model could be made dynamic, allowing for changing economic 
conditions and also for explicit investment. NManager is a partial equilibrium model. Its 
solutions assume that regulation within the catchment does not affect input prices.
15 This may 
not be reasonable in the short run when workers are immobile and capital for investments in 
mitigation is scarce. NManager also ignores the pressure imposed on land outside the catchment 
as land use within the catchment changes under regulation.  
The value of complex regulatory systems could also be more deeply assessed. We could 
rigorously explore the conditions under which complexity would be valuable. We could also 
more realistically model the value of complexity. As more complex regulatory schemes have 
higher costs of information, landowners will be more likely to seek satisfactory rather than 
optimal solutions. There will be a range of satisfactory solutions, many of which will be similar to 
the optimal solution. Complex vintage trading systems, with allowances for loads many years in 
                                                 




the future, are also likely to lead to strategic behaviour where the credibility that a regulation will 
still be enforced, and hence allowances still have value, many years in the future is low. Some 
limitations on current use of long vintages would probably be necessary in reality. 
Finally, the current version of NManager ignores uncertainty as it assumes landowners 
have perfect information and the foresight required to plan 100, or more, years ahead. 
Landowners are in fact unlikely to plan more than 10 years ahead due to uncertainty and 
bounded rationality (the longest bond offered by the New Zealand Treasury is 12 years). 
Uncertainty could be introduced into the model by considering landowners’ expectations of 
future leaching and land use.  
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Appendix A: Solving Trading Schemes Numerically 
A solution over    time periods may be found using the Newton-Raphson algorithm: 
Starting from an initial price vector       iterate, until all prices satisfy the market clearing 
conditions, updating the prices at each iteration as follows: 
                  
   
   
 
  
      
where       and       are column vectors and  
   
   
  is the      derivative matrix. 
The vector       is calculated numerically as given above. An approximation to the 
  ,     entry of the derivative matrix is calculated as follows: 
   
   
  
   
       ; ,              
              ; ,        
   
 
Where      is a vector of zeros except for the     entry which suitably small, and 
  
       ; ,        is the demand for allowances of vintage   if landowners have optimised their 
allowance holdings. 
We include an adjustment to handle the situation where the vintage caps are non-
binding. This occurs where     0  and     0 . In this situation we wish to prevent any further 
decrease in the price of the vintage. This can be done by deleting the rows of       and       and 
the rows and columns of  
   
   
  that correspond to the non-binding vintage caps before updating 
      to generate        . 
Appendix B: The Input for the Profit Functions 
The profit functions used in NManager were fitted to estimated profit and mitigation 
points for dairy, sheep-beef farming and plantation forestry. This section explains how these 
points were estimated. 
Profit and leaching for dairy and sheep-beef farming 
Output from Farmax was used to determine the profitability and leaching of different 
farm management practices for dairy and sheep-beef farming. Farmax works from baseline 
scenarios provided by monitor farms. Monitor farms are theoretical farms, constructed from 40 
 
current data, designed to represent a typical farm in a specific region (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 2010b). 
The Waikato/Bay of Plenty dairy monitor farm is representative of approximately 5,060 
dairy farms in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. The monitor farm has 110 hectares of 
land, milks 310 cows (heifers are grazed off the farm for 12 months), and produces around 
97,000 kg of milk solids in a normal season. This implies a gross profit of around $127,000 in 
2009 (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2010a). 
The Waikato/Bay of Plenty sheep-beef monitor farm is representative of approximately 
720 sheep-beef farms in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. The monitor farm has 300 
hectares of land, 2,900 stock units, and a gross profit of around $53,000 in 2009 (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2010a).
 16 
Different scenarios for the dairy model included various combinations of changes in cow 
stocking rates, wintering patterns, imported feed usage, and nitrogen fertiliser usage. Different 
scenarios for the sheep-beef model included changes to stocking rates, animal ratios (sheep : 
cattle; bulls : cows) and nitrogen fertiliser usage. Although Farmax is designed to assist the user 
to maximise their profit per hectare, the model relies on the user to propose and assess the 
feasibility of different management decisions. We recognise and thank Smeaton, who used his 
farming knowledge and expertise in attempting to define profit-maximising strategies for 
landowners while maintaining specified leaching targets (see Smeaton et al., 2011). 
Profit and leaching for forestry 
Forestry is the least nutrient-intensive land use considered for the Lake Rotorua 
catchment. Landowners may choose to convert land to forestry as part of managing their 
nutrient leaching. 
Annual profits per hectare from forestry were calculated for all parcels in the catchment 
identified as forestry by the Land Use and Carbon Analysis System (LUCAS). Profit for each 
parcel was calculated according to Olssen et al. (2010). This considers information on land slope, 
soil type and the distance from the nearest port. These measures were used to estimate wood 
yield and the costs of planting, pruning and logging. Lastly, profit for each land parcel was 
averaged over the entire catchment. 
                                                 
16 The Farmax simulations treat interest and the cost of capital differently to the monitor farm reports. 
Hence, the values for profit per hectare reported in Table 3 differ from those implied by the monitor farm reports. 
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New Zealand has implemented an emissions trading scheme. Under this scheme the 
profitability of forestry is expected to increase. However, landowners are currently behaving as 
though the effective long-term price for carbon is close to zero. This is probably largely due to 
uncertainty in the future price of carbon (Karpas and Kerr, 2011). The potential gain in profits 
from forestry under New Zealand’s emission trading scheme is therefore not included in 
NManager. 
Appendix C: Risks of the Two-Pulse Vintage Scheme 
We observed that under the two-pulse vintage scheme the price of each vintage 
allowance depends on the prices of all other allowances. This is because landowners demand 
allowances of two different vintages to cover leaching from a single year of production. 
In NManager we observe that a two-pulse vintage scheme can result in short-term 
oscillations in the equilibrium price of vintages.
17 This is a sporadic phenomenon: certain 
combinations of allowance caps and lag times result in price oscillations, while other 
combinations do not. We do not observe price oscillations with any of the results elsewhere in 
this paper. 
Regulatory schemes that result in price oscillations may have additional associated costs. 
There may be adjustment costs in responding to changes in vintage prices, or the cost 
effectiveness gains of the trading scheme may decrease if allowance trading is discouraged. 
Figure 14 gives an example of price oscillations arising from the two-pulse vintage 
scheme. We observe short-run oscillations in prices with a period of 20 years and long-run 
oscillations with a period of 150 years. 
                                                 
17 In fact, any regulatory scheme where landowners must surrender allowances of more than one vintage 
can result in price oscillations. 42 
 
Figure 14: Oscillations in the equilibrium price of vintages under the two-pulse 
scheme 
 
The short-run oscillations arise from regularities in the lag times. Consider the 
differences between the lag zones as given in Table 5. There is a 20-year difference between 
consecutive lag times for the five lag zones at the back of the catchment (lag zones 4–8). This 
corresponds perfectly to the 20-year periodicity of the short run price oscillations. 
Experiments suggest that the long-run oscillations are independent of the timing of 
pulses. As the long-run cycle has minimal affect on allowances prices between years (less than a 
$1 or two percent effect over the entire cycle) we do not consider this cycle to be worrisome and 
do not investigate it any further. 
The price oscillations demonstrated here occur under the assumption that each 
landowner’s mitigation decisions are independent across time. However, if landowners have 
adaptive price expectations or the cost of changing mitigation practices is significant, then 
landowners will have incentives to keep the same mitigation practices over several years. This 
may reduce the magnitude of the price oscillations (Krugman, 1991).  
Appendix D: Simulating the R-300 Scenario 
To help compare the results from ROTAN and NManager, we consider the retirement 
of land and mitigation specified in the R-300 ROTAN scenario which reduces exports from their 
current level by 300 tN/yr by a step change in 2015. The R-300 scenario details that all dairy land 
is converted to sheep-beef, and around 16 percent of the sheep-beef land is converted to new 

































land decreases to 10.4 kg N/ha/yr and the leaching from new lifestyle blocks is 6 kg N/ha/yr. 
Note that the R-300 scenario does not quite reach the target lake load; a reduction of 320 tN/yr 
is needed to reach the target. 
Figure 15 gives the total lake loads under best the R-300 scenario. The load path without 
regulation and the unmanageable loads are provided for comparison. 
Figure 15: Nutrient loads under R-300 scenario 
 
Under regulation, we observe a step decrease in lake loads due to surface water in 2015, 
followed by loads tending towards their long-run values. The R-300 scenario results in long run 
loads of 454 tN/yr and has a net present value of the cost of mitigation of $76.4 million. As this 
cost arises from different environmental outcomes to the designs of regulation considered in 
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